زيارة خاصة-أسعد أبو خيل

Debate on Libya's opposition

Below is a debate I had with Mark Sleboda one of the admins of the Facebook page Free Libya.

Moustafa Yaftasem: I like it, except for the characterization of rebels as fundamentalists.

Free Libya: Mus, all of the TNC's military commanders are veterans of the LIFG. Bel Hadj himself was an associate of Osama Bin Laden. Now, if we assume that Bin Laden's inner circle actually believes in its own discourse (i.e. that it's something more than just a drugs mafia that colludes with US intelligence) then we have to acknowledge that it is pretty fanatical (obviously this doesn't extend to all rank & file rebels).

Moustafa Yaftasem: I am not denying that there are LIFG elements within the ranks of the commanders, but that doesn't mean that the bulk of the opposition are islamists, most of them are ordinary libyans who couldn't even shoot a gun before the uprising started, so I don't agree with the characterization depicted here. Furthermore if we take this caricature more literally we will see that there is a contradiction that AlQaeda or its affiliates are proud collaborators of the west, post war in Afghanistan. The opposition isn't monolithic and ranges from liberals to islamists, who just so happen to be the ones best trained for commanding the military operation against qaddafis forces.

Free Libya: ‎1. Al-Queda is not a unitary actor, in that sense as a global organization it does not exist.. It is a pan-Islamic fundamentalist franchise, a brand, an idea, a blowback against the Western globalization of their lands and societies. The LIFG are far more convernced with the realization of their vision of Islam in their own land than with any global struggle

2. Neither the LIFG nor the US have any principled qualms about momentarily working with one another to meet their short term goals, with a short-term term view of their interests. To whit - the US and UK have a long history of collaboration with fundamentalist Islam against socialist states, which it has always regarded as the greater threat. Fundamentalist Islam and the tactics it has desperately employed, outgunned as it is, called terrorism has never presented a serious or existential threat to the West or the idea of the West. If anything the blowback of fundamentalist Islam has been useful to it, as a pretext to exapand even further into the Islamic world, and to become more openly totalitarian at home.

3. I agree that the disparateTNC rebellion is made up of Islamists, 'liberals' (whatever exactly this mythical universal concept means in a Libyan context), monarchists, self-exiles returned from the US and London, fools, and traitorous corrupt and power hungry officials from the old regime (what the vast majority of the TNC political leadership is including Jalil and Jebril) - but none of those are any more redeemable, or less loathsome than the others. These, fringe minorities of the Libyan population all, would not have been successful without NATO/GCC arms, training, planning, logistics, C4ISR, supplies, strategic bombing, close air support, drones, naval blockade, cruise missiles, special forces, and even shocki troops. The one things the rebels did provide was pretext and serving as useful stage extras for the global media show to recast a foreign coup as a domestic revolution.

4. I can't see anything in that cartoon that distinguishes the 'rebel' as 'fundamentalist' as opposed to a returned exile from the West or a 'liberal' or monarchist. Not that it makes any difference. In the end they are all slaves of NATO/the West now, whether they know it yet or not. The one thing that is somewhat incorrect is to show him raising a Kalishnikov, the weapon of the Libyan Army and Defense forces. The 'rebels' were largely armed with NATO issue Belgian assault rifles and NATO standard ammunition from even before Feb, 17th [according to Russian military sources]

Moustafa Yaftasem: I agree with everything except the generalization in point 3. Surely Qaddafi's regimes has forcefully exiled some dissenting libyans in the last 42 years. And although the TNC heads the opposition the categories that you reduced the Libyan Opposition to leaves out the ordinary Libyans who supported the uprising without any ideological motive (instead of fundamentalist we can just say they were moderates) that they were just tired of Qaddafi's rule, regardless of how naive or "foolish" they were. There are plenty of contradictions within the Libyan Opposition who only agree that Qaddafi's rule should end, but where they go from here is hardly something determined given how diverse they are.

Free Libya: Their future is already determined by who their 'liberators' were and who those liberators have chosen to elevate as their local puppet leaders. It is a fait accompli. The only choice the Libyan people have is accept the neoliberalization and privatization of their country, ie what the rebels have largely unknowingly fought for, like good little pawns or sheep - or as the Islamists and Loyal Libyans who believe in the Jamarhiryah are likely to do, not accept that, and create a brief bloody period of violence and resistance before they are killed or subdued. Either way it is only a matter of time, and mostly Libyan blood. The West has created a sick world where they can profit off of destruction even more than creation, so it matters not to them.

Moustafa Yaftasem: And regarding the "slaves" description you added, this is somewhat naive. Qaddafi wasn't a dissenter of globalism and he started market liberalization to please his western leaders. Wikileaks has shown the degree the US were collaborating with the regime politically economically and in security. The only one opposition to US plans was adding Libya to Africom.

Free Libya: Quaddafi accepted limited market intrusion, as all socialist countries have had to do post 92 to survive in a neoliberal capitalist world without the USSR as patron and protector. However, this was only limited and he most certainly was an ideological dissenter from global capitalism, hands tied as they were. The grudging acquiesce he gave the West was never the total assimilation and submission they require. Minority shares and short term leases in Libya's oil and water wealth (Quadaffi's GMMR) could never satisfy Western neoliberalism, esp when they had to sit their and watch the vast majority of Libya's oil wealth be 'wasted' on maintaining Libya's extensive system of social benefits and rights, one of the last of such remaining in the world. Quaddafi also acted as a geopolitical leader for African states to ever so occasionally resist Western interests (Africom as you mentioned being one such example). Just the idea of a socialist-ish and direct democracy system as the Jamarhiryah is opposition enough to the West to want to see it crushed. The 'Long War' is a war, not only against Fundamentalist Islam, but to End History and to extinguish any other alternatives to Western globalization.

Chomsky and BDS

I have a lot of respect for Chomsky, and rarely do I find my thoughts in conflict with his own. My introduction to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to anarchism and the Kibbutz movement is all thanks to his writing. His views on BDS are not mainstream and he has several criticisms of it. Below is a summary from the following interview by Frank Barat:


Chomsky argues that BDS must be principled. Why should Tel Aviv university be boycotted, when American universities that are complicit and actively participate in far greater war crimes are not being challenged, he argues? What makes Israeli crimes special? Why should Israel be boycotted when its enabler and biggest supporter, the US, which is also responsible for far greater crimes is not facing a call for BDS. This picking on Israel could hurt the Palestinians. Just because some Palestinians have asked for BDS against Israel, doesn't mean we should blindly follow it, but should first ask whether these actions are going to hurt the Palestinians. Action needs to be principled, he says, and if they're not it will be a gift for Israeli right and Zionist sympathizers and will cause cries of antisemitism which will make it even harder to talk about Palestine, and therefore, it's counterproductive.

Chomsky believes that the one state solution is not much more than a slogan, similar to asking for a no-state solution. He says that there is no reason to worship imperial boundaries and he would like to see all states with their oppressive institutions and boundaries dissolved. He says he does not know of any advocacy of the one state solution, all he keeps hearing is a slogan that we should all live in peace. He says the two state solution which is the international consensus should be advanced. One of the ways this could happen is if the IDF pulls out of the West Bank, which will only happen after withdrawing  US support. When that happens almost all of the illegal settlers will move to Israel proper, and et voila, a functioning Palestinian state, which the Palestinians in exile can return to. With time, he says, the borders between Israel and the future Palestinian state could begin to erode, and there might be some settlement in the future where both states are combined and the descendants of the refugees of 48 could return right back to their original hometowns in Israel. Regarding the right of return of the refugees he says the right should be affirmed but it is never going to happen because there is absolutely no support for it, and if there were, Israel would use nukes to prevent it from happening. He says that resolution 194 doesn't mention the right of return of the descendants although certain organisation have interpreted it to include them. Sooner or later he says Israel will accept resolution 194 because there will be no one left.

Well, if Israel continues to build its settlements as it has been doing since 71, and making it even more difficult for a two state solution, it will eventually realize it has no option but for the one state solution. But according to Barghouti the BDS movement has was overwhelmed the progress has made and it might be sooner or later that Israel is pressed to do something. I just ordered his book. 

Political Drugs

Bilal Fadl

Your friend is someone who is honest with you not someone who tries to please you just so you can feel good, so please allow me to bother you with my astonishment that you may consider removing the Israeli flag from on top of the Israeli embassy and replacing it with the Egyptian flag as some sort of political or even symbolic victory. After the January revolution I thought we no longer need symbolic victories as much as we need to pursue realistic ones. In my opinion, if this action symbolises anything it is our strong frivol and misapprehension of our surrounding reality, and sadly shows that some of us have become prisoners of symbolic victories in the fields of amiss.

So that you can understand my bothersome idea more clearly, let me take you from what happened in front of the Israeli embassy to what happened in front of and inside the state security headquarters. Do you remember how ecstatic thousands of activists were when they stormed the headquarters that was paved to them in a carefully calculated way, and how they were amazed to find documents that were deliberately left behind for them? Some turned out to be forged just for the activists' sake, so the truth can mix with fiction and the real secrets could remain archived in electronic format far from their angry hands. The activists considered what happened an unprecedented historical victory and their happiness climaxed when the decision was made to dissolve the State Security system and replaced it with another system called National Security. They attacked those like myself that asked instead of dissolving State Security, it should be put under complete judicial supervision and committees should be assembled to investigate all its activities, including the tremendous wealth accumulated by its top officers and their affiliations. They thought that this proposal corrupts their achievement of toppling tyranny and dictatorship. Ok, and now five months after disposing this symbol, let's ask ourselves: where is the judicial supervision and the various apparatus of the Ministry of Interior that are supposed to be monitoring the new National Security system from which, for example, we can determine the truth of what happened to the Alexandrian activist Mahmoud Sha'aban? Who will bring justice to the thousands that were tortured and lost their futures by this system? Have the fortunes of the inflicted officers been investigated in the abuse of human rights? And who can guarantee that the officers are not just as corrupt when they are moved to a new location? Have the activists been involved in pursuing issues like these or were they just satisfied with disposing the symbol of deception?

Let us return to what happened in front of and above the Israeli embassy where the Israeli flag was taken down and replaced by the Egyptian flag by the young and brave man Ahmah AlShahat. What I liked most about him is that he works as a carpenter six days of the week, and for his day off he goes to Tahrir square. This to me symbolizes the greatest achievement of the January revolution: that it caused millions of Egyptians to take action rather than the passive satisfaction with the reality that they have been entrenched with for thousands of years. I watched a TV interview for Ahmed and I honoured him and loved his lucidity, and I prayed that no harm should come his way, [...] but I don't think he's the symbol that Egypt needs in regards to the struggle against Israel. Perhaps because I'm feeling languid, or maybe because since the January revolution I stopped consuming political drugs. I realized the way to defeat Israel starts with liberating the palace of Arabism. Or, perhaps because whilst Ahmed was climbing the building to reach the Israeli flag I knew that was a young Israeli man at the Dimona nuclear plant working on improving his nation's nuclear capabilities, and another young Israeli woman working in a cancer research lab subsidized by the state with millions working on a cure for cancer which will return billions in profit, and another young Israeli man protesting with complete peace of mind because he isn't vulnerable from military trials, and even if someone were to abuse his freedom to protest he knows that justice will be served. No Israeli needs to climb on top of the Egyptian embassy and replace the Egyptian flag with the Israeli because they understand that the power of the nation isn't embodied in cotton that waves on top of any embassy.

I realise that most of those who demonstrated outside the Israeli embassy aren't delusioned and know that what happened isn't the end of our struggle against Israel. Most of them, by the way, protested with all their courage against military trials for civilians and chanted demanding toppling of military rule. But I am sad that day by dad they don't realize they are looking for symbolic achievements and distant themselves from the right path to topple military rule. It saddens me they they believe that the Egyptian citizen can sympathize with slogans for waging war against Israel when they first need an internal victory against autocrats, exploiters and the corrupt. It saddens me that they don't realize that they are being politically exploited these days. It saddens me they don't ask why they were allowed to do what they did this time in particular; just like they didn't ask why they were allowed to reach Abassaia when it was possible to prevent them in Abdelmoneim Riyad Square, for example. It saddens me that this revolutionary power is dissipated daily as superficial opposition and tampering squabbles instead of chanelling them into serious efforts that produces political currents that are connected to the streets, so that the activists don't remain a deaf cluster provoked by carefully calculated situations, to realize when it's too late that it's abondaned by the public that it revolted for.

I'm from a generation that had the biggest dream of doing what happened infront of the Israeli embassy. This action was considered a fantasy in the 90's. Our biggest dream when we protested the murder Mohammed Durra is that we reach Attaba and become martyrs there. But now we've realized this dream and we've also realized that reaching the top of the Israeli embassy or even inside of it won't bring us a step forward. We will win our civilized battle against Israel if we have a longer breath, calmer, and sharper, and with less concentration on appearances and symbols. So will the generations that will follow us realize this and save time that we and the generations before us have wasted?

If you've considered these sentences veraciously annoying worthy of consideration, then many thanks. If you've considered it to be the grounds of the final chapter between you and me then let me tell you that it was only a draft.

Translated from Arabic, and I may have left out a phrase or two.

Tahrir News, August 23rd 2011

Follow up on my article in +972

My last post was published in the Israeli magazine +972 with the title 'Antinormalisation: unhelpful to Palestinians' and it generated a lot of controversy and misunderstanding to which I must respond. Some of the responses were thoughtful and critically constructive, and some were just knee jerks to the title: I am blaming "antinormalisation" ergo I am a "normaliser." This logical error lead to denounciation by pro-Palestinians, and praise by pro-Israelis. The thoughtful responses mainly criticized the way I used the term anti-/"normalisation" although I didn't try to define it but was simply referring to the way Arabs use it in avoiding to engage with Palestinians in Israel-Palestine as well as Israeli Jews who oppose Israel's policies towards the Palestinians. In this follow up I'll try to summarize the comments my article recieved and clarify certain issues.

Firstly, I'd like to explain how I came to publish this article in +972 - an Israeli magazine, whose readers are presumably mostly Israeli - when my article is addressing Arabs. This is sadly because I was unable to publish at Electronic Intifada, Kabobfest or Jaddaliya. The former two never responded. Jaddaliya's co-editor replied that the article was considered but wasn't selected. Perhaps my use of the term antinormalisation was the reason they refused. My next choice was +972 Magazine, which provides news and insightful commentary from Israel and the occupied territories that I learn from and share and I was happy to contribute to it. (THIS ISN'T AN ACT OF NORMALISATION!!) So I sent my article to one of its editors, and I was pleased by her enthusiasm for publishing it.

In the first revision of my article the editor said that the title "What the Arabs can do" wasn't descriptive enough. So I added, "What the Arabs can do for Palestine" which was initially accepted (as you can tell from the article's URL) but then rejected by the main editor who thought that it was still not descriptive enough for publication. Then the editor(s) decided unilaterally to its current title that I never agreed to. My editor told me that I can still change it but I couldn't think of a better one so it wasn't changed. Furthermore the editor(s) added the word 'policy' to the article's description. I haven't used this word before in my article nor did I see it when reviewing with my editor prior to publication. I wasn't criticizing a "policy of anti-normalisation." I was criticizing the Arab practise of "antinormalisation". I didn't bother changing this either because I didn't have time to go back and forth with the editor, and readers were already commenting on what they read. So I swallowed these two errors and hoped that my readers would go beyond the title and description, read my essay and contemplate the point I was making. After catching some sleep I read the comments in +972 and reactions from Twitter, and I realized the consequences of an Arab criticizing "the policy of antinormalisation" on the front page of an Israeli magazine.

In the comments sections of the article I briefly responded to some of the comments made against my use of the term "antinormalisation," and I apologised to my readers and the Egyptian Independent Union Federation for not mentioning two of their three "principled reasons" to why they were opposed to the now dissolved Egyptian Federation of Trade Unions. However, as all three reasons are principled, the "participation in a visit to occupied Jerusalem" was independent of the two I omited, and I used this particular opposition as an introductory example of how Arabs generally refuse to visit Palestine or engage with Israeli Jews in the name of antinormalisation. But to make sure I understood the EIUF's position fully, I looked up the original Arabic statement. Article 5 says,

ترفض النقابات المستقلة بشكل قاطع أي شكل من اشكال التطبيع مع العدو الصهيوني او أيا من مؤسساته الرسمية أو الحزبية أو النقابية أو أي جهة تنتمي إليه بأي طريقة. كما ترفض النقابات المستقلة التعامل مع أي جهات أو أفراد يمارسون التطبيع أو يدعون إليه أو يوافقون عليه. وتؤكد على دعمها الكامل لحق الشعب الفلسطيني العربي في إقامة دولته المستقلة على كامل التراب الفلسطيني وحقه الكامل في استخدام كافة أشكال المقاومة من أجل الحصول على حقوقه. كما تؤكد النقابات المستقلة أن أحد أهم أسباب رفضها للتنظيم النقابي الرسمي إلى جانب تبعيته للسلطة والحزب الوطني المنحل هو مشاركته في زيارة السادات للقدس وعدم اتخاذه أي موقف تجاه سياسات التطبيع مثل اتفاقية الكويز وتصدير الغاز وغيرها من السياسات التي تواطأ عليها الاتحاد الرسمي للعمال بصمته في الوقت الذي كانت الحركة العمالية المصرية ترفضها وتقاومها.

"The independant unions confirm that one of their main reasons for their rejection to the official union federation aside from its subservience to the state and the now-dissolved National Democratic Party is its participation in Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and its failure to take any position against the normalisation policies such as the QIZ [Qualified Industrial Zones] agreement and the gas export agreement and other policies which the Egyptian Trade Union Federation by its silence was complicit whilst the Egyptian workers’ movement rejected them and was resisting them."

As you can see Arabawy's translation omitted the reason behind EFTU's visit. They were participating in Sadat's historical visit to Jerusalem in 1977 which marked the beginning of normalised relations between Egypt and Israel. My impression from Arabawy's translation was that they were strictly against a visit to Jerusalem because it is under occupation, a position taken by the overwhelming majority of Arabs. Having understood this my criticism of their position as "championed irrational parochialism" is incorrect. I should've picked on someone else as an introductory example to my essay.

Regarding the normalisation between Egypt and Israel, we can understand the logic why many Egyptians who are opposed to it might refuse visiting Israel and the occupied territories as this was only possible after the fact. Is this contradiction significant enough to pass on a visit to Palestine? I don't think so. I think we should take advantage of it and do what we can in helping the Palestinians and engaging with Israeli dissidents. As Edward Said says,

One of the things that I try to do, in a very uncompromising and quite open way, is to say, We have to break that attitude. We have to break out of our self-constructed mind-forged manacles and look at the rest of the world and deal with it as equals. There's too much defensiveness, too much sense of aggrieved, unfulfilled whatever. This is in part account for the absence of democracy. It's not just the despotism of the rulers, not just the plots if imperialism, it's not just the corrupt regimes, not just the secret police. It's our intellectuals' lack of citizenship and keep insisting on. For myself, since there is little that I can do at this distance, whether in person or through my writing, is to keep making that point. The only way to change a situation is oneself doing it, reading, asking, encountering, breakout of the prison.

Comments by Miki criticized my use of the term "normalisation." As I said before, my article made no attempt to arrive at its definition but only criticizes how it is used. Antinormalisation in practise, not in theory. She insists that I don't understand the political definition of anti-"normalisation," and references a definition:

"Normalisation means to participate in any project or initiative or activity, local or international, specifically designed for gathering (either directly or indirectly) Palestinians (and/or Arabs) and Israelis, whether individuals or institutions; that does not explicitly aim to expose and resist the occupation and all forms of discrimination and oppression against the Palestinian people."

If we assume this policy of normalisation is correct there should be absolutely no problem of bringing together Arabs with Palestinians and/or Israeli dissidents who are in Israel or in the occupied territories. But the overwhelming majority of Arabs consider this a replusive act of normalisation. Perhaps if I included this definition in my article it would have strengthened my argument, but I still don't think not having it subtracts from the point that I was arguing, namely that the Arab understanding of "normalisation" is harmful to the Palestinians.

I also said in the article that antinormalisation - in the practical sense I alluded to - was different from BDS. Miki noted that this shows that I have no political understanding of the term. She is right, I didn't have and only learnt the "correct" definition after reading her comments. I really had no use of the term because I kept on hearing it as an excuse to a point where it has been evacuated of any meaning. My article didn't imply that we should "normalise" with Israel, or accept its occupation, but that we should be pragmatic. That we should deal with the fact of occupation by doing more than whining about it.   

I recently watched the Tunisian actress Hindy Sabry's interview on Yousry Fouda's show Akher Kalam where she talked about her visit to the West Bank. She was invited by the Kasaba International Film Festival amongst other prominent Arab cinematographers, none of which attended except the director Nadia Kamel. She thanks god that she visited Ramallah and says that she will never regret it no matter how much the Arabs blamed her for it. "Normalisation has been one of those words we repeat without understanding what it means." she says. She recalls how happy the Palestinians were by her visit,

You can't describe their happiness when we visit them because they are not treated as news material that you watch and cry for infront of the TV but as real human beings.

They repeated to her a reassuring saying by the Palestinian leader Faisal Al-Husseini

زيارة السجين ليس تطبيع مع الساجن

Visiting a prisoner is not to normalise with the warden

Now that would have been an awesome title for my article in +972! I will work on an Arabic version of my article which will include everything I learnt from the commentary, which will of course include the definition of "normalisation" provided by the BDS campaign.